After spending far too much time on this...Speaker of the House Glenn Richardson was accused in 2007 of having an affair with a lobbyist. An ethics complaint was filed by a Democratic Party operative, stating that the affair was common knowledge.
A Republican ethics panel threw the complaint out, saying that saying something is common knowledge doesn't count as evidence. The speaker and his wife later divorced and the case was sealed by a judge who, The Atlanta Journal Constitution reported, has connections to the speaker's law firm.
Long time watchdog George Anderson, who has filed numerous ethics complaints, particularly against Republicans, filed a motion with the court to unseal the speaker's divorce records. Divorce records are commonly public record in Georgia.
Mr. Anderson, through his attorney, argues his case in part by quoting a Georgia Supreme Court case titled Atlanta Journal and Atlanta Constitution v. Long, 1988. In that case the court ruled that:
A party who moves to seal court records has the burden of overcoming this presumption, by demonstrating that “the harm otherwise resulting to [his privacy] clearly outweighs the public interest,” USCR 21.2. The trial court has the corresponding duty to weigh the harm to the privacy interest of that party from not sealing the pre-judgment documents against the harm to the public interest from sealing the documents. Before sealing the documents, the court must conclude that the former clearly outweighs the latter.
That's from a
Westlaw summary of the case. The italics are mine. The court also said that:
Further, such allegations {found in the case file} could be misused to promote private spite or promote public scandal through the publication of the details of the allegations and serve as a reservoir for libelous statements. In the preceding conclusion, the trial court speaks of the privacy interests of the appellees. However, the court's findings and conclusions do not explain how the embarrassment the appellees may suffer differs in degree or kind from that of parties in other civil suits. Embarrassment has always been a problem in civil suits, yet traditionally it has not prompted trial courts to routinely seal pre-judgment records.
Italics again mine, as is anything between the {}, which I've added for clarity.
Speaker Richardson, acting as his own attorney, argues in his response to Anderson that the case should remain sealed. In the portion I quote below, "Long" refers to the case quoted above and "Rule 21" is Uniform Superior Court Rule 21, which states that “[a]ll court records are public and are to be available for public inspection unless public access is limited by law or by the procedure set forth." Again, that's from Westlaw. From the speaker's counter motion:
Movant fails to cite the court to the corollary assertion of Long, which recites as follows:
The rule (Rule 21) also preserves another traditional right - the right of superior cours in exeptional cases to shield court records from public view.
Atlanta Journal v. Long, 258 Ga. 410, 369 SE 2d755 (1988). Such a clear statement by the court is exactly what this court is authorized to decide in an exceptional case involving the private lives of a wife and children of a public official on a domestic relations matter, which is uncontested, consented to by the parties, involves child custody, child support and matters relating to financial division of assets between private parties. Such an exceptional case is left to the sound discretion of the trial court after hearing from the parties as the court did in this case.
The italics = mine again. This is from Mr. Anderson's response to Speaker Richardson's response:
Richardson’s response indicates that “exceptional” treatment is warranted because this is a case “involving the private lives of a wife and children of a public official on a domestic relations matter which is uncontested, consented to by the parties, involves child custody, child support and matters relating to financial division of assets between private parties.” Richardson Response to Motion to Unseal at {page} 5.
These asserted reasons are simply insufficient to show that this is an “exceptional” divorce case or that the interests in closure “clearly outweigh[] the public interest.” Atlanta Journal and Constitution v. Long, 258 Ga. 410 (1988); Uniform Superior Court Rule 21.
Divorces typically involve children, custody issues, sensitive family matters, division of financial assets and thankfully many too are uncontested. Thus, the only exceptional aspect articulated as to the Richardson divorce is that it involves “a public official.” Surely, public officials are not entitled to special secrecy of their divorces simply because they are public officials.
You think you're exhausted. I spent hours on this, and I was pretty much ignoring the whole issue until the speaker said,
in a court filing,
without citing any evidence, that
The AJC is run by a bunch of sensationlistic liars. In fact he says this has been "well established." That's essentially the same as saying it is "common knowledge." Which is what got the ethics complaint against him thrown out in the first place.
You can't make irony like that up.
Now. I have questions, not answers.
1. What makes the speaker's case "exceptional?"
2. Does the Richardson family's right of or need for privacy outweigh the potential public good that may come from the divorce records being unsealed?
The speaker has said he wants to protect financial details for the sake of his wife and children. But it's realistic to wonder if there's information in the file about this alleged affair, which is of public concern given the position of influence that would have put this lobbyist in. And I question what financial privacy the speaker and his wife enjoyed prior to this case, because campaign finance laws
require them to disclose financial holdings.3. If you don't unseal these records, what precedent has been set? Will all public officials' divorce proceedings be private, while the average taxpayer's are public?
4. Speaker Richardson has often noted that this court action was consensual between he and his wife. So, presumably, they agree on the facts detailed in the sealed documents. Presumably those facts are the truth. Why hide the truth?
Even as I wrote that last question, I knew the answer. Because we would abuse it. The media, the readers, Democrats, the speaker's intra-party enemies. That's a damn shame, but is it a larger problem than the one presented by a public official (allegedly) trying to bend the system so it treats him different?
Perhaps all divorces should be sealed. I don't know.
Finally, I'd like to thank a friend of mine, who happens to be an attorney, for providing me with the Westlaw summary. He is from Smyrna, Georgia, and a Campbell High School graduate. And I'd like to end with some language from the Journal and Constition v. Long court decision, which is surely too beautiful to apply to something so unfortunate as divorce:
In the State of Georgia, the public and the press have traditionally enjoyed a right of access to court records. Public access protects litigants both present and future, because justice faces its gravest threat when courts dispense it secretly. Our system abhors star chamber proceedings with good reason. Like a candle, court records hidden under a bushel make scant contribution to their purpose.
